Neoliberalism and Health and Social Policy


Francisco Armada, Carles Muntaner, and Vicente Navarro

International financial institutions have played an increasing role in the formation of social policy in Latin American countries over the last two decades, particularly in health and pension programs. World Bank loans and their attached policy conditions have promoted several social security reforms within a neoliberal framework that privileges the role of the market in the provision of health and pensions. Moreover, by endorsing the privatization of health services in Latin America, the World Health Organization has converged with these policies. The privatization of social security has benefited international corporations that become partners with local business elites. Thus the World Health Organization, international financial institutions, and transnational corporations have converged in the neoliberal reforms of social security in Latin America. Overall, the process represents a mechanism of resource transfer from labor to capital and sheds light on one of the ways in which neoliberalism may affect the health of Latin American populations.

Most Latin American countries have implemented extensive reforms of their welfare states, reforms characterized by a shift, from the public to the private sector, in the delivery and financing of health and other social security services such as old age and disability pensions and workers’ compensation. The arguments for the effectiveness of such changes follow the neoliberal paradigm that assigns to the private market the ability to best allocate and use resources, even in the field of public health. The purpose of this analysis is to investigate the role of international financial institutions (IFIs)—the Word Bank, International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)—in the
reform of social security in Latin America, evaluate the position toward such
policies by the World Health Organization (WHO), and find out who directly
benefits from these reforms.

First we present the context in which the social security reforms were imple-
mented in Latin America as part of broader structural changes. We then examine
the participation of the IFIs, particularly the World Bank, in health care and
pension reform, as well as the position of the WHO as a supporter of these reforms,
mostly in strengthening the role of the private sector in health services. Next we
show the economic benefits to private corporations resulting from social security
reforms. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of social
security reforms in Latin America for the commodification of health and repro-
duction of social inequalities, and we comment on some possible policy alter-
atives to the dominant neoliberal dogma.

BACKGROUND: NEOLIBERAL POLICIES IN LATIN
AMERICA IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

Neoliberal reforms of social security in most Latin American countries were
implemented along with broader economic structural changes that began in the
mid-1980s under strong pressure from the IFIs. These broader policies were
directed at stabilizing national economies, controlling inflation, reducing fiscal
deficits, opening national economies to international trade, increasing labor
market flexibility, and reducing government intervention in the definition and
implementation of social and economic policies (1–8). Although the ultimate goal
of these measures is supposed to be the promotion of economic growth, they are
related to the need of IFIs to ensure that less developed countries can pay their
external debts (9).

Navarro has identified several underlying hypotheses in neoliberal thinking:
(a) public deficits are intrinsically undesirable; (b) state regulation of the labor
market is also undesirable; (c) social protections guaranteed by the welfare state
and its redistributive policies hinder economic growth; and (d) the state should
not intervene in regulating foreign trade or international financial markets (10).
The principles behind these postulates are (a) the market is the best and most
efficient way to create, produce, distribute, and allocate goods and services;
(b) people follow rational choices mainly determined by their own individual
interests; and (c) social security services, including health and pensions,
are commodities (11).

The implementation of neoliberal reforms in Latin America has reached virtu-
ally every country in the region, although there is substantial cross-national
variation in the timing, speed, extent, and other characteristics of the programs
implemented (12, 13). Overall, the Structural Policy Efficiency Index—a quanti-
tative index of structural adjustment policy implementation, with a maximum
value of 1 indicating extensive reform—increased in the region from 0.34 in 1985 to 0.60 in 1995 (5).

The IFI-promoted social security reforms were implemented despite the lack of rigorous evidence on the benefits of the free market for social policy (14). A key assumption of these IFI-supported projects is that market forces make services more efficient—an argument unsupported by the evidence. In fact, studies in the United States and other nations where market principles have been extensively applied to social services provide evidence to the contrary. For instance, empirical studies show increased inequities resulting from the privatization of health services (15), higher administrative and overall costs among for-profit providers (16, 17), worse health outcomes for patients receiving care in for-profit rather than not-for-profit institutions (18), and barriers to health care access in industrialized countries that heavily rely on private health systems (19). Moreover, user fees effectively reduce consumers’ available income and exacerbate health inequalities (20).

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCING INSTITUTIONS IN SOCIAL SECURITY REFORMS

The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank have directly intervened in social policy-making by dictating major health care and social security reforms. Loan conditions and negotiation of payments of external debts have been the major tools of political leverage used by IFIs. A general objective of the IFIs has been the alignment of social policies with broader neoliberal changes (21–23). The “letters of intent” that indebted Latin American countries have submitted to the IMF provide evidence of how health and pension reforms are embedded in major economic policies.

These letters include a description of the policies countries intend to implement or have already put in place in order to comply with IMF recommendations and obtain access to loans. For instance, in 1998 Jorge Camet, Peru’s Minister of Economy and Finance, and Germán Suárez, president of Peru’s Central Reserve Bank, sent a letter to Michel Camdessus, managing director of the IMF, in which they described “the policies that Peru intends to implement in the context of its request for financial support from the IMF.” They included details of arrangements to maintain Peru’s balance of payments of its external debt and a declaration that the government of Peru intended “to service its debt to all other creditors punctually.” The letter also enumerated other measures, including privatization of public enterprises, concessions granted to the private sector for the provision of public services, and continuation of the pension system reform that was initiated in 1993, featuring the issuing of pension bonds to former contributors to the public pension system who chose to transfer to the private system. Furthermore, the letter states, “The government will seek to complement its efforts in the education and health sectors by facilitating private investment in these areas.” It also notes that
“in 1997 the government issued a new law allowing private companies to provide health services within the social security system” (24).

We can draw several other notable examples from these documents. The Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies of the government of Jamaica describes Jamaica’s macroeconomic objectives and policies for the years 2000 to 2002 to be implemented in the framework of an IMF-monitored program. The letter stresses the fiscal objectives of the plan and describes several actions directed to strengthening private markets, including development of a supervisory framework for pension funds. The plan also includes implementation of cost-recovery (i.e., self-financing) activities as a way to rationalize operations in the education and health sectors (25). The government of Honduras, in a letter from Hugo Castillo (Acting Minister of Finance) and Victoria Asfura de Diaz (president of the Central Bank of Honduras) to Horst Köhler (managing director of the IMF), reports the accomplishment of “four of the five prior actions required for the IMF Executive Board review of our Second Year Economic Program under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility,” including elaboration of a plan to reform the Honduran Social Security Institute. In the same letter, as part of the policies that “Honduras intends to implement in the context of its request for financial support from the IMF,” the submission to Congress of a draft law to regulate private pension funds was noted (26). The government of Ecuador, in another letter of intent to the IMF, describes the policies it intended to implement in 2000 and some already implemented in the context of a request for financial support of almost $300 million. Some of the measures included replacement of the national currency by the U.S. dollar, restructuring of the payment of the external debt, and reform of the social security system. In addition, it states “the government is undertaking a comprehensive pension reform, and is committed to allowing private sector participation in the provision of pensions” (27).

Although most Latin American and Caribbean countries are represented in the IFIs, the North American and Western European countries control the policy-making process, since shareholding and voting at the World Bank are determined by the size of a country’s economic assets (28). For instance, in 1999 the largest industrial countries (United States, Japan, Germany, France, and United Kingdom), with about 37 percent of the shares, controlled the World Bank policies; and the United States, with the largest shareholding (16.53 percent), had an implicit veto power. The other countries assembled in groups to sum their shares, with one country assuming the representation of the whole group. For instance, in 1999, Canada represented a group of several small Caribbean countries with 3.88 percent of the shares. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Spain, and Venezuela together pooled 4.27 percent of the shares and were represented by Spain (3). Regardless of their country of origin, the boards of directors of IFIs are likely to represent the hegemonic interests of national and transnational corporations (29).
The World Bank has lent billions of dollars to Latin American countries to encourage neoliberal reforms. In 1999 the amount reached $7,737 million (all dollar amounts in U.S. dollars), including a considerable amount for the social sector (Table 1). For example, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) reported that World Bank involvement in 30 health projects in 18 countries amounted to $2.5 billion at the beginning of 1997; and participation of the IDB in 49 loans for the health sector totaled $4.3 billion between 1992 and 1996 (30).

Although the IFIs are the major financers of the reforms, the participation of national agencies for international cooperation, based in industrialized countries, is also common in programs that encourage the adoption of neoliberal policies. For instance, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has assigned several million dollars for health programs through the Child Survival and Disease Fund, the amount requested in fiscal year 2001 reaching $86 million for Latin America (31). Financing is particularly targeted to the poorest countries, such as Bolivia and Guatemala, where privatization of the health sector has been encouraged (32, 33). For instance, a USAID document states, “In the private sector, operational support will continue for Bolivia’s model self-financing, high quality, primary health care provider (PROSALUD), and USAID will add more to an endowment for long term sustainability.” It also states that USAID will finance Bolivia’s largest private provider of family planning services and a federation of 24 private and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (34). Moreover, the role of this agency in pushing an ideological agenda in Latin America, even on epidemiological grounds, has also been described (35).

The IFIs have participated actively in the design and implementation of diverse social programs, an activity that, with some exceptions, has not been subject to scrutiny in the public health arena (14, 36–38). The two areas of social policy in which the interventions have been most extensive are health care reform (carried out to some degree in most Latin American countries) and pension reform (mainly in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay) (30, 39–41). We address here the main features of reforms that have encouraged a growth of the private sector in the provision of health care and pensions.¹

Health Reforms

Health care reforms in most Latin American countries have been supported by World Bank and IDB loans (Table 2). The stated objectives of the loans were to boost the financial sustainability, equity, efficiency, and quality of health services, as well as to extend coverage to the poor (1–3, 42). Ironically, in some cases the

¹A third area of intervention by the IFIs, within social security, has been workers’ compensation programs. In Colombia and Argentina, new companies were created with the sole responsibility of handling workers’ compensation and were often owned by the same shareholders as pension fund companies (see Table 5).
Table 1

Lending to Latin America and the Caribbean, fiscal years 1988–2000, millions of U.S. dollars\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>FY 88–92\textsuperscript{b}</th>
<th>FY 93</th>
<th>FY 94</th>
<th>FY 95</th>
<th>FY 96</th>
<th>FY 97</th>
<th>FY 98</th>
<th>FY 99</th>
<th>FY 00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>515.8</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>604.5</td>
<td>1,909.50</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>630.2</td>
<td>562.5</td>
<td>2,403</td>
<td>1,311.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health, population, and nutrition</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>1,086.40</td>
<td>136.8</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>157.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social sector</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>640.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water supply and sanitation</td>
<td>261.5</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>521.5</td>
<td>221.5</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>147.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,593.80</td>
<td>6,168.50</td>
<td>4,746.70</td>
<td>6,060.40</td>
<td>4,437.50</td>
<td>4,562.70</td>
<td>6,039.70</td>
<td>7,737</td>
<td>4,063.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Source:} World Bank (2–4).

\textsuperscript{a}For fiscal year 2000 we used information on a loan-by-loan basis. “Social sector” corresponds to “social protection.” The amount and classifications for the same year change slightly from one report to another.

\textsuperscript{b}Annual average.
need to alleviate the negative social impact of economic reforms promoted by the IFIs themselves was also included among the goals of the loans (28), for instance in Ecuador (27). The activities financed by the World Bank and IDB include designing new health care systems, strengthening the agencies responsible for designing and regulating health policy, providing health care for low-income groups, decentralizing health services, and conducting research on health policy (1, 30, 43–45). Regardless of the type of intervention, most initiatives have favored the private financing and provision of health care over the former public financing and provision that predominated in most Latin American countries (45–48). The move from public to private represents a major shift in the financing, delivery, and ownership of health services. Even in Brazil, which had a national health system aimed at universal coverage, the private health sector has increased its participation in the provision of health services (49, 50).

Two major and closely related reform strategies promote the privatization of services: separation of the financing and provision of health care and promotion of competition between providers. In contrast to the integrated functions of the traditional public sector, separation of financing from provision allows for the independent functioning of “buyers” and “sellers” of health services (51). The sellers must compete among themselves for the preference of buyers. This system, also favored in North America and Europe, promoted the creation of a market in the provision of health care (52–54). The Chilean and Colombian models exemplify this approach (55, 56).

Every Chilean must choose enrollment in either the public or the private health system, both of which are financed through a compulsory payroll contribution of at least 7 percent of salary. The public system allows a free-choice option, depending on the enrollee’s income, in which the enrollee chooses among private providers that are paid by the public system. The private system is dominated by the Instituciones de Salud Previsional (ISAPRES; Private Health Insurance Institutions), which offer health insurance and are financed through fixed mandatory payroll contributions. The ISAPRES act as private financers of health care and often directly provide health services, assuming a role similar to that of North American health maintenance organizations (57). The ISAPRES are expected to compete for patients (in terms of costs and coverage of services) among themselves and with the public system, Fondo Nacional de Salud (FONASA; the National Health Fund) (58, 59).

In Colombia the reform gave rise to separate private financers and providers of health care. The Entidades Promotoras de Salud (EPS; Health Promotion Organizations), private purchasers of health services, compete among themselves for the compulsory payroll contributions of beneficiaries, who are free to choose the EPS they prefer. The Instituciones Prestadoras de Servicios de Salud (IPSS; Health Service Providers), providing health services directly or through contracts with individual providers, are expected to compete for the preference of the purchasing organizations (EPS). Colombia also has a subsidized plan financed
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>Cost in U.S.$ millions</th>
<th>Date of approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Health Sector Reform Project</td>
<td>IBRD: 25</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Health Sector Reform Project (951/OC-BR)</td>
<td>750 (IDB: 350; World Bank: 300; local: 100)</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Program for the Regulation of Private Health Plans</td>
<td>IMF: 1.55; local: 1.55</td>
<td>199?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Program to Support Health Sector Reform (910/OC-CO)</td>
<td>63 (IDB: 38; local: 25)</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Health Sector Modernization and Restructuring (1047/OC-DR)</td>
<td>75 (IDB: 61.2; local: 5.3)</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Program to Upgrade Health Care Services (890/OC-GU and 891/OC-GU)</td>
<td>40.5 (IDB: 38.5; local: 2.0)</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Health Sector Policy and Institutional Development Program (TC-95-03-11-2-GY)</td>
<td>2.75 (IDB: 2.5)</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Health Sector Reform Program (1028/OC-JA) and Technical Support to the Health Reform Unit of the Ministry of Health (ATN/CI-4995-JA)</td>
<td>25.7 (IDB: 17.7; local: 8.0)</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Support of the Health System Reform</td>
<td>IBRD: 700</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Assistance to Support the Design and Implementation of the Health System Reform Program</td>
<td>IBRD: 25</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>First phase of the Health Sector Modernization Program</td>
<td>IDA: 24</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total cost: 32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
through a solidarity fund in which 1 percent of the payroll of all enrollees is invested; this fund provides health care for low-income members who do not contribute through a third kind of institution, the Empresas Solidarias de Salud (ESS; Solidarity Health Companies), which also act as a purchasers’ association (60, 61).

In both Colombia and Chile, then, separation of the provision and financing of health care led to creation of new private providers financed through mandatory income transfers from the salaries of beneficiaries and through state subsidies. Other explicit mechanisms for privatizing health care provision are included in World Bank and IDB loans, including “cost recovery” (e.g., user fees) in health care services (62), autonomous administration of hospitals and services, privatization of services, and subsidies to private health insurance. For instance, the Ecuador Health Services Modernization Project included categorization of users according to income, development of a system of copayment, and user charges (63). Another example is a $24 million project for modernizing the health sector in Nicaragua leading to the creation of private wards “catering to those able to pay”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>Cost in U.S.$ millions</th>
<th>Date of approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Program to Strengthen Health Services (741/OC-PE)</td>
<td>98.0 (IDB: 68.0; local: 10.0; other: 20.0)</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Health Care Reform Program (803/OC-PN)</td>
<td>52.8 (IDB: 42.0; local: 10.8)</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health Sector Reform Pilot Project</td>
<td>IBRD: 4.3</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>Health Sector Reform Program (937/OC-TT)</td>
<td>192 (IDB: 134; local: 58)</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Program to Strengthen and Modernize the Health Sector (867/OC-VE)</td>
<td>300 (IDB: 150; local: 150)</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


as a mechanism for financing public hospitals. This project is explicitly aimed at
the strengthening and growth of the private sector in the provision and financing
of health care. The activities of this project included support for the elaboration of
comprehensive legislation concerning the Ministry of Health, Social Security,
private health insurance, private providers, hospitals, and health professionals
(64). These new systems reinforced differential access to health care depending on
income in Latin America (50, 65, 66).

In addition to their participation in health care system reform, the IFIs (and in
some cases USAID) have also increased their influence in public health through
the design and financing of specific public health interventions in Latin American
countries (3, 31, 66). For instance, interventions include care for the “vulnerable”
sectors of the population: mothers and young children (Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, and Nicaragua) and the retired, disabled, and unemployed (Brazil).
Programs also cover increased access to water supplies (Paraguay and Bolivia),
measures to control the spread of HIV/AIDS (Argentina, Brazil, and Honduras),
and strengthening of national disease-surveillance programs (Brazil) and nutrition
programs (Honduras) (2-4). The organizations responsible for implementing
these programs are often NGOs or new governmental agencies other than the
ministries of health (67, 68). Although NGOs have good reputations in liberal
circles in the United States (e.g., 69), their role in Latin America has further
increased countries’ financial dependence for social and health programs,
expanded the IFIs’ influence over health policy, and limited the role of the state in
the provision of health and social services. NGOs backed by this mode of
financing take over functions that correspond to national governments. Therefore,
contrary to the claimed objectives of reforms, the role of the ministries of health
and governments, has been weakened rather than strengthened (29, 70–72).

Pension Reform

Following establishment of a new pension system in Chile in 1981 during
Pinochet’s dictatorship, in the 1990s other Latin American countries enacted
legislation to modify their pension systems: Peru in 1993, Argentina and Colombia
in 1994, Uruguay in 1996, and Mexico in 1997 (73, 74). Before this wave of
reforms, the dominant pension systems in Latin America were state-administered
and state-provided “pay-as-you-go” social insurance schemes. As in the case of
health reforms, deficiencies in the financial sustainability, efficiency, equity, and
coverage of the pension schemes were presented as major justifications for
change, but arguments about aging populations were also prominent (39, 75, 76).

The World Bank provided the major guidelines for pension reform in a report
whose title summarizes two aspects of the process: Averting the Old Age Crisis:
Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth (77). Its recommendations for
change include creation of three pillars for pension management: a public pillar to
alleviate poverty among the old; a second, mandatory pillar that is fully funded by
individual capitalization of contributions and privately managed; and a third, voluntary pillar for those wanting additional income in their old age. Furthermore, the World Bank in this report endorsed and promoted the reforms carried out in Chile, and even pointed out how in Latin America, as “the region entered in the 1990s, the movement to privatize pensions gained momentum, urged by the success in Chile” (77, p. 276).

In contrast to the old systems, the responsibility for pension arrangements is transferred to individuals and the amount of each pension is directly linked to individuals’ contributions (78, 79). Mandatory contributions are a fixed percentage of the worker’s salary, but the amount of the pension is undetermined. The government may establish a minimum pension amount, which will be covered by national funds if a worker’s contributions have not provided for this minimum pension (41). Two major pension options are available: planned withdrawal and life annuities (78). In the latter, the funds are managed by insurance companies, further extending the role of the private sector in social security (80).

The World Bank and its allies expect economic growth among the countries that institute pension reforms. Particularly, the second pillar is expected to promote capital accumulation and financial market development (77). New schemes include creation of private institutions that take sole responsibility for managing the contributions of enrollees. These pension fund management companies, Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs), invest enrollees’ money and produce dividends, and the accumulated individual contributions and returns support the payment of pensions when each beneficiary retires. The AFPs’ investments will supposedly boost the economy through national capital markets, assuming national savings increase. In addition, the labor market will become more flexible because of the reduction of employers’ responsibility for their workers’ social security. The strong association between pension reform and economic expectations is evident in the close links between pension reform and the wider structural reforms (based on neoliberal paradigms) in which that reform is framed. Thus, pension reform is viewed as another element of economic liberalization rather than a mechanism of income redistribution and social well-being (81).

The AFPs profit in several ways from this business. A percentage of the compulsory contribution of about 2 percent of a worker’s salary goes to these companies and is the basis of their economic gain. The companies can also choose to earn a profit by taking a percentage of the accumulated contributions or a percentage of the returns produced by the investment. They can also charge for financial services. In Argentina an average of 3.37 percent of workers’ salary is used to cover the administrative costs and profits of the AFPs (Table 3) (82). Although the Mexican system allows a charge over and above the returns on investments of workers’ contributions, only one in 13 pension fund management organizations (called AFOREs in Mexico) choose this option (the toll was established in one-third of the net returns). Ironically, most AFOREs prefer
not to derive their profit from successful investing—contrary to their recommendation to their clients, whose pensions will depend on such returns. Rather, for these AFORES, a fixed percentage of workers’ salary ensures a secure profit, regardless of a company’s degree of success in investing their clients’ money (83, 84).

As with health care reforms, IFI loans have played a crucial role in pension system reforms across Latin America (Table 4). IFI financing has covered several pension reform projects, including feasibility studies, changes in legislation, creation of new agencies, and implementation of reforms. For instance, IFIs granted loans for the preparation of legislation in Mexico and Uruguay and for the extension of pension reform to provinces and municipalities in Argentina (Table 4). One of the most recent pension reform projects has been Nicaragua’s: “its transformation from a government administered Defined Benefit scheme to a privately operated Defined-Contribution system.” Such reforms were expected to “contribute to enhance macroeconomic stability, impact positively on poverty and

Table 3

Mean charges on mandatory contributions
(as percentage of salary) by pension fund
gmanager (AFP), Argentina, October 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund manager (AFP)</th>
<th>Mean charge$^a$ (as % of salary)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARAUCA BIT</td>
<td>2.7451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSOLIDAR</td>
<td>3.5138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUTURA</td>
<td>3.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAR</td>
<td>2.4666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MÁXIMA</td>
<td>3.5049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACION</td>
<td>3.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORIGENES</td>
<td>3.5375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREVINTER</td>
<td>3.5119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREVISOL</td>
<td>3.5928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROFESIÓN + AUGE</td>
<td>3.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRORENTA</td>
<td>3.5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIEMBRA</td>
<td>3.5489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDOS</td>
<td>3.4906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>3.3746</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


$^a$Charges do not include the discount provided to beneficiaries for not changing company for an extended time.
inequality and facilitate the development of a private sector provision of services as well as the deepening of financial and capital markets” (85).

Yet, benefits for national economies are not as evident as are those for pension fund managers. Countries that privatized their pension systems had high hopes for its salutary effects in the economic arena, but an evaluation of the Chilean system (which has the longest experience) concludes that (a) neither the state burden nor the administrative costs have been reduced, (b) the impact on the expansion of labor and capital markets has been less than expected, and (c) economic power has been concentrated in the hands of the companies managing pension funds (86). Evidence available so far suggests a similar impact in other Latin American countries (87). Furthermore, as Barrientos points out, the cost of the new private pension systems is much higher than that of the public pay-as-you-go systems, owing to high charges over workers’ salaries and the cost of marketing and sales personnel (81). Indeed, the World Bank’s former chief economist, Joseph Stiglitz, identified the lack of security of the private pension systems as one of their major weaknesses: “There is a recognition that the private market doesn’t provide many types of insurance that individuals need and want for their retirement.” Furthermore, he pointed out, referring to the promotion of private pension funds in “developing” countries, “I think there has been an element of ideology in pushing that” (quoted in 88).

VALIDATION BY INTERGOVERNMENTAL HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS: THE PAHO AND THE WHO

The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the WHO, and other intergovernmental institutions such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) are converging with the IFIs in their policy approach for Latin America: the importance of stressing private approaches for the financing and provision of social security services. This view has been actively sponsored by the World Bank since the 1980s (14)—see, for example, the World Bank’s Financing Health Services in Developing Countries: An Agenda for Reform (89) and World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health (90).

PAHO participates in several cooperative projects with USAID and the World Bank. Together they launched the Latin America and Caribbean Regional Health Sector Reform Initiative (91), a project whose goal is to track the pace and characteristics of health reforms in the Americas. PAHO has also participated in a project in collaboration with the World Bank, IDB, UNDP, and the Denmark Consultant Trust Fund to measure inequalities in the Americas, the EquiLac Initiative (92). In both cases, the IFIs, important stakeholders in the process, finance the evaluation of their own interventions. PAHO has also collaborated with World Bank Health Reforms Projects, for instance a 10-year project in Bolivia (93). Support for the health sector reform process is one of the common strategies included in the Shared Agenda for Health in the Americas, an agreement
Table 4
Selected World Bank and IDB loans to support pension reform, Latin America, 1996–2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project name or description</th>
<th>Cost, U.S.$ millions$^a$</th>
<th>Date of approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for the government’s provincial pension fund reform program</td>
<td>IBRD: 300; total: 400</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of allocation of pension benefits and payments (National Pension Administration)</td>
<td>IBRD: 20</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Markets and Pension Reform Technical Assistance Project. It included among its objectives “establishment of the regulatory structure for the system of individual capitalization pension” and studies of workers’ compensation</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical assistance to help state governments address pension reform</td>
<td>IBRD: 5; total: 10</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Social Security Reform, basing pension on years of contribution, eliminating most special pension regimes, and reducing inequalities between benefits of public and private sector workers</td>
<td>IBRD: 757.6</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Social Security Special Sector Adjustment Loan</td>
<td>IBRD: 500</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of the regulatory capacity for pension reform</td>
<td>Total: 20; IBRD: 15</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Transformation Support for the Instituto Salvadoreño del Seguro Social</td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project name or description</td>
<td>Cost, U.S.$ millions&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Date of approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico Support for the first phase of the government’s Contractual Savings Development Program, which will establish legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks for reforming the old age security system</td>
<td>IBRD: 400</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second phase of the above</td>
<td>IBRD: 400</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua Pension Reform Technical Assistance (TA) Project, including “introduce new insurance, and capital markets instruments for a pension fund investment, by implementing a revision framework for private sector participation in new pension aspects.” “The Pension and Financial Market Reform TA will design and implement: ii) a mandatory, funded, defined contribution pension system of privately managed individual pension accounts.”</td>
<td>Government: 2.6; IDA (World Bank): 8</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru Pension Reform Adjustment Loan</td>
<td>IBRD: 100</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay Social Security Reform Program; assistance with implementation of social security reform law; draft any new legislation needed to adapt pension plans that cover certain occupational groups to the new system (921/OC-UR)</td>
<td>IDB: 150</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support development of the capitalized system of individual pension accounts</td>
<td>IBRD: 100</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>a</sup>IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; IDA, International Development Association.
between the World Bank, IDB, and PAHO to develop a common agenda for health in the Americas (94). Furthermore, PAHO has explicitly endorsed a strengthening of private sector participation in health care delivery in Latin America, as is evident in some of its reports (95, 96).

The WHO has also been following the trend to support private participation in health care delivery, and its implicit support, at least in Latin America, is evident in its evaluation of health care systems’ performance (97). The health systems of Colombia and Chile—which, as we have noted, have undergone in-depth reforms favoring participation of the private sector in provision and financing—were ranked highest among the Latin American countries. As derived from the report, the lesson to be learned by Latin American countries is to strengthen the role of the private sector in financing and delivery of health care. Moreover, the WHO ranked Colombia first in the world in fairness of financial contributions, one of the five categories of health system evaluation used to rank health systems. This classification does not look at fairness in the distribution, allocation, or use of resources. For instance, the universality of the Colombian health care system is based on two different health plans: one directed to those above a certain economic level, who are enrolled in the private-run system of the EPS; the other a subsidized plan that provides much less comprehensive coverage for those unable to make full contributions to the private system. Thus, stratification of health care according to the ability to pay is institutionalized. The WHO’s support for these health systems, as well as its call for strengthening the role of government in supervising private provision as a way to facilitate the role of the private sector in health care, shows its convergence with the World Bank. The WHO report has been questioned for its lack of scientific rigor and its ideological approach (98, 99). Similar concerns about the influence of corporate interests in international institutions have been raised regarding the UNDP (100).

These associations between international health agencies and IFIs, apparently justified by budgetary deficits (102), not only reinforce the power of the IFIs in shaping health policy in Latin America but also jeopardize the independence of international agencies in policy evaluation and design, technical cooperation,

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2 The Directory of Experts and Bibliography about Poverty and Social Development in Latin America and the Caribbean compiled by the UNDP (101) provides another example of IFIs’ interventions. Within a project of poverty alleviation and social development, this is a directory of experts on poverty and social development in Latin American countries. Of the 125 listed experts, 16 hold a position within the World Bank or the IDB and an additional 30 declared previous or current working relations with one or both institutions; together they represent 36.8 percent of the experts identified by this agency of the United Nations. Given that most of these experts are part of the ruling class of their countries of origin, they are likely to voice the interests of that group. Furthermore, the absence of experts who are critical of neoliberal policies is notorious; one cannot find scholars such as Asa Cristina Laurell (Metropolitan University, Mexico), Jaime Breilh (Centro de Estudios y Asesoría en Salud, Ecuador), Saul Franco (Universidad Nacional de Colombia), or Howard Waitzkin (University of New Mexico), all of whom have described the negative impact of World Bank policies on social development in the region.
research, and assessment of the social and health effects of economic policies. This is why studies on the impact of neoliberal policies in Latin American countries and policy recommendations for the region are shaped by the interests of the IFIs, even when the studies are carried out by intergovernmental agencies (11, 35). Thus it is not surprising that the same PAHO publication that describes with concern the growth in health and income inequalities also points out that one of the key areas of World Bank assistance to the Latin American countries is “improving health outcomes for the poor by supporting programs that improve the equity and access to a range of preventive and clinical services; enhancing efficiency in the health sector, particularly by encouraging competition”; and “fostering a balanced public/private mix that involves greater private sector participation in areas such as cofinancing, management, public sector service contracts” (30; emphasis added).

A major consequence of these social policies validated by the WHO is the growing privatization of social services in Latin America. These changes in the provision of services have mirrored and complemented the privatization of other public enterprises and services, such as water, telephone, electricity, and airlines, from which local and transnational ruling classes have benefited (103). In the next section we present evidence on the beneficiaries of such privatization.

BENEFICIARIES OF THE PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY: THE TRANSNATIONAL AND NATIONAL CORPORATIONS

Several North American and European companies have entered or reinforced their participation in the health and pension markets in the Americas (Table 5 and Figure 1). They belong to an extended network of companies that provide interrelated financial, banking, investment, and insurance services. The review of these companies’ reports indicates an increased share of the social services market in Chile in the 1980s, but it was mainly during the 1990s that most transnational companies intensified their presence in Latin American countries as providers of health care or pension management services (104–107).

North American corporations participate significantly in the provision of social security services in Latin America. Stocker and colleagues (108) have provided evidence of the activities of these corporations in a report on the export of managed care to Latin America. Whether using managed care or other similar approaches to health care, Aetna, CIGNA, AIG, and Citibank (Citicorp) controlled large sectors of health care and pension funds in several countries by the end of the last decade.

The main sources of information for this section, unless otherwise noted, are the home pages of the companies and agencies on the World Wide Web. We reviewed data from official Web sites of companies and agencies involved in the regulation, provision, or financing of health, pension, and workers’ compensations programs. These Internet sources, retrieved between March and November 2000, are listed in the Appendix.
Table 5

International provision of social security services in Latin America, 1999–2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National origin</th>
<th>Services&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Countries of investment (companies)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>WC</td>
<td>HIH</td>
<td>Argentina (HIH, <a href="http://www.hih.com.ar">www.hih.com.ar</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Sun-Life</td>
<td>Chile (Cuprum, <a href="http://www.cuprum.cl">www.cuprum.cl</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>P, WC</td>
<td>CNP Assurance S.A.</td>
<td>Argentina (Previsol and Asociart)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Assicurazione Generali S.P.A.</td>
<td>Argentina (Generar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Banco Santander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Skandia</td>
<td>Colombia (Skandia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Zurnex Canada Holdings, Ltd.</td>
<td>Mexico (Zurich, <a href="http://www.zurich.com.mx/">www.zurich.com.mx/</a>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5  
(Cont’d.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National origin</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Countries of investment (companies)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>ING Holland</td>
<td>Peru (Integra Peru); Mexico (Vital, <a href="http://www.bital.com.mx">www.bital.com.mx</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>WC</td>
<td>AIG</td>
<td>Mexico (AIG Mexico, aigmex.com/index2.htm); Peru (Pacifico Salud, wwwelpacífico.com)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Services": H = Health, P = Pensions, WC = Workers' Compensation.
Aetna is one of the biggest North American companies in the Latin American private social service market. It entered early in the Chilean market and created a pension fund management company, AFP Santa Maria, and a second enterprise, Aetna ISAPRES, in charge of health care. It used the first company to open similar businesses in Peru (AFP Integra) and Mexico (AFORE Bancomer). In Brazil in 1997, Sul America Seguros (which reported premiums of $1.2 billion) joined Aetna to form Sul America Aetna. In 1999 Aetna’s share of the Argentine market skyrocketed when it acquired the largest health care company in that country, Asistencia Médica Social Argentina S.A. (AMSA), for approximately $100 million. We can find examples of the transfer of money from Latin American countries to the United States in Aetna’s 1999 annual report, which records gains in the Americas of $147.5 million in 1999, $112.9 million in 1998, and $83.0 million in 1997. Furthermore, during the first three quarters of 1999, Aetna reported an increase in operative earnings of 72.9 percent, reaching $98.4 million (106). An estimate of how much Aetna benefited from the privatization of social security in Latin America is hard to make, since these amounts include other areas of business and Aetna often purchases or sells pensions and health companies. For instance, in September 2000 Aetna announced its plan to sell a Mexican pension fund manager, AFORE Bancomer, for $693 million to a financial group led by the
Spanish Bilbao Vizcaya Bank (BVAB) (109). In November 2000 Aetna called a shareholder meeting to discuss the sale of all its international businesses to a Netherlands-based financial and insurance company, ING (110).

Several other North American companies have taken part in the private provision of health care, pensions, and workers’ compensation services. For instance, Citibank owns shares in several pension fund management companies:
Profuturo in Peru, Colfondos in Colombia, Capital in Uruguay, and Garante in Mexico. In Argentina, Liberty Mutual participates in Liberty ART S.A., providing workers’ compensation services, and the Berkley Corporation takes advantage of the same field with a different company. New York Life Insurance participates in the private pension business through AFPJ Maxima in Argentina; and Sun Life of Canada joined a Chilean financial group in AFP Cuprum.

The U.S. government, through its departments of Commerce and State, has promoted this participation of U.S. enterprises in the privatization of social security in Latin America. In several reports prepared by these agencies, the loans and projects of the IFIs were included as “business opportunities.” For instance, a telegraphic report from the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, in reference to the later-approved Health Sector Modernization Loan from the IDB, stated that a “significant part of the health care modernization project of government will be funded by IDB and the World Bank. In this regard, there is up to 120 USD [U.S.$] million in potential business to U.S. companies” (111). The U.S. Foreign Commercial Service and the U.S. Department of State, in a report on health services in Argentina, identified the provision of managed care through the program of “self-supporting hospitals” (directed at the self-financing of public hospitals) as another business opportunity (112).

European companies have also entered the Latin American health and pension services market. Three Spanish companies dominate the scene: two huge financial groups, Banco Santander Central Hispano (BSCH) and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBVA), and one insurance company, MAPFRE. These companies are present in several countries and are involved in pensions, health care, and workers’ compensation in addition to several other businesses. In fact, BBVA claims to be the major manager of pensions in Latin America, with a 31 percent share of the market. BBVA reported a net benefit in 1999 of 13 million euros (AFP Provida, Chile), 28 million euros (AFJP Consolida, Argentina), and 35 million euros (AFJP Siembra, Argentina). In Argentina, BBVA is also involved in providing workers’ compensations services (104). These three enterprises participate in a large network of institutions that provide diverse social security services in Latin America. As most of their reports indicate, these services create considerable profits, in addition to an opportunity to expand other financial, banking, and insurance businesses in Latin America (104, 105, 107).

Other European enterprises also provide social security services in Latin America, though to a lesser extent. A Nordic company, Skandia, manages pension funds in Colombia; it claimed to cover 9 percent of the local private pension market in 1999 (115). A British company, HSBC, takes part in the pension fund manager Maxima in Argentina. CNP Assurance, a French state-owned company, is involved in pensions through AFJP Previsol and in workers’ compensation

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4 Several Spanish banks, including BBVA, were linked to the fascist Francoist regime (113, 114).
Local companies have also benefited from the privatization of social security in Latin America. Formations of associations with foreign companies or the sale of national businesses to transnational corporations has been a common practice. For instance, the main shareholders of the Mexican fund administrators (AFORES) are both Mexican and international (Table 6). Some AFORES are dominated by Mexican companies, others by transnational corporations, and still others by an association between the two (83, 84).

Some local economic elites have increased their wealth by gaining direct control over health care and pension fund services. For example, after new legislation was approved for the social security reform in Colombia, a well-established financial group, Suramericana, created several companies to participate in the privatization of social services based on compulsory contributions: SUSALUD (Compañía Suramericana de Servicios de Salud) for the provision of health services; Proteccion, S.A., for the management of pension funds; and SURET, in charge of workers’ compensation services. These three new companies joined an already diversified business network in the financial arena that paradoxically also included a tobacco company (116).

Chile provides another example of the benefits of privatization to local capital. Banmédica, a company that originally provided health care to bank clerks, had become a large corporation by the end of the 1990s. Its network of companies includes a health care provider (ISAPRE), life insurance, emergency paramedic care, and real estate business. It even explored the international arena with joint ventures in pension funds in Peru (AFP Horizonte) and Argentina (AFJP Previar) and with a health care provider in Colombia (Salud Colmina). In 1997, after acquiring another health care provider (Compensacion) and a clinical center, Banmédica reported income of over $260 million and coverage of 800,000 people in its Chilean health care business (117).

LESSONS FROM NEOLIBERAL INTERVENTIONISM

The World Bank and other IFIs, along with the WHO and international corporations, have engaged in a common quest to replace the traditional role of the public sector in the welfare state with private control of the provision of social services. The IFIs have influenced the design and implementation of health and social policy in Latin America through the promotion of structural reforms in the provision of health care, pensions, and other social services. Complementary intergovernmental agencies in the health arena have reinforced this approach by supporting a growing participation of the private sector in health care. According to our analysis, transnational and national corporations linked to the financial
Table 6
Pension funds administrators (AFOREs) in Mexico: Shareholders, percentage of shares, and country of origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AFORE</th>
<th>Shareholders</th>
<th>% of shares</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bancomer</td>
<td>Bancomer, S.A., Grupo Financiero Bancomer</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aetna International</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Santamaria Internacional, S.A.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banamex</td>
<td>Banco Nacional de México, S.A., Grupo Financiero</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegon</td>
<td>Banamex-Accival</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aegon Mexico Holding B.V.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vital</td>
<td>Seguros Bital, S.A., Grupo Financiero Bital</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>Netherlands,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spain,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal</td>
<td>Principal International Inc.</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inbursa</td>
<td>Banco Inbursa, S.A., Grupo Financiero Inbursa</td>
<td>94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Electric Assurance Company</td>
<td>05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tepeyac</td>
<td>Tema Vida</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caja de Madrid Vida, S.A., de Seguros y Reaseguros</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXI</td>
<td>Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IXE Banco, S.A., Institución de Banca Múltiple,</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IXE Grupo Financiero</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bancrecer</td>
<td>Bancrecer, S.A., Grupo Financiero Bancrecer</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dresdner</td>
<td>Dresdner Pension Fund Holdings, LLC</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allianz México, S.A.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garante</td>
<td>Citybank México, S.A., Grupo Financiero Citibank</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>México, S.A., Grupo Financiero Citibank</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Habitat Desarrollo Internacional, S.A.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profuturo</td>
<td>Grupo Nacional Provincial Pensions</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.N.P.</td>
<td>Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, S.A.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provida Internacional, S.A.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santander Mexicano</td>
<td>Banco Santander Mexicano, S.A. Grupo Financiero Santander Mexicano</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Santander Investment, S.A.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
arena have emerged as the major economic beneficiaries of these reforms, and several companies are currently profiting from the provision of health and pensions services in Latin America. The political process by which the World Bank and other IFIs have promoted such policies, the WHO has backed them, and private corporations have benefited demonstrates the predominance of ideological arguments that favor the interests of capital. This process also imposes a vision of health and pensions as commodities rather than fundamental human and social rights.

We maintain that the implementation of neoliberal policies in the social arenas in Latin America has reproduced already-existing social and economic inequalities by promoting a transfer of resources from the majority of the population to capitalist classes at both the national and international levels. Those capitalist classes are the wealthy owners of financial and physical capital (118). For the neoliberal reform of social security in Latin American countries, alliances between local and international capitalist classes promoted and took advantage of the conversion of social security services to private commodities.

Indeed, some scholars have suggested that neoliberal policies favored the transfer of resources (e.g., income, wealth, environmental security, and political power) from labor to capital within countries and from the peripheral (or “third world”) to the core (or “first world”) countries (119, 120). We differentiate five dimensions of such transfers.

First, regardless of their labor conditions, all salaried workers are compelled to enroll in social security programs that require compulsory payroll taxes to finance

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Table 6

(Cont’d.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AFORE</th>
<th>Shareholders(^a)</th>
<th>% of shares</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sólida Banorte</td>
<td>Banco Mercantil del Norte, S.A., Grupo Financiero Banorte</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Italy, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participatie Maatschappij Graafschap Holland, N.V.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zurich</td>
<td>Zurmex Canada Holdings, Ltd.</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources:* Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro (CONSAR), www.consar.gob.mx. Original table modified, country of origin added by the authors.

\(^a\)Banco Santander Central Hispanoamericano (Spain) and Banco Comercial Portugués (Portugal) hold 8.3 percent each of the shares of Grupo Vital; www.bital.com.mx. It is not clear whether ING (the Netherlands) owns 50 percent and plans to acquire, or already did acquire, another 50 percent of AFORE Bital.
the system, including a percentage for the profit of private fund managers. (Any welfare state requires workers to contribute, of course, but in a public scheme all the contributed resources are invested in the welfare of the majority and do not profit a particular group of society.) These reforms of social security have led to the creation of private companies that profit from the management of workers’ resources; this constitutes a transfer from workers to the capitalist classes.\(^5\) The different systems mandate that a percentage of workers’ wages be transferred to cover social security costs, but also including a profit for private businesses. Compulsory contributions from salaries vary among countries. For instance, in Chile it includes 10 percent for old age pensions, 3.2 percent for disability and survivors insurance, and 7 percent for health coverage; and additional voluntary contributions are encouraged, up to 10 percent for pensions and between 3 and 4 percent for better health packages. In Mexico the salary-based contribution for pensions, handled by the privately owned pension fund managers, is 6.45 percent for old age pensions and unemployment. The percentage assigned to pension fund managers for administrative cost (including profits) is frequently fixed to the salary and is about 2 percent; see, for example, the charges of the different private managers in Argentina (Table 3) (41, 83, 122).

Second, the reform of social security required the use of public resources for the transition to a new system. In the case of pensions, governments have to pay with fiscal resources for all the pensions in the former system. In Bolivia the transition costs were derived from the privatization of public enterprises (73). Such use of resources increases the transfer of resources from the majority of the population to small, economically privileged groups.

Third, the external debt, which played an important role in the implementation of neoliberal policies and explains the IFIs’ further political and economic leverage over indebted countries for the last two decades (123), is another source of resource transfers from the Latin American countries. Paradoxically, IFI loans to finance social service reforms, including the transition from old to new social security schemes and even special programs to alleviate the negative impact of neoliberalism, further increased or contributed to maintaining the external debt already owed to IFIs by Latin American countries. In addition, most of these loans generate service payments or fees. For instance, consider the following World

\(^{5}\)Not all local capitalists benefited, nor were all labor groups disadvantaged. Local capitalist classes hold diverse and often contradictory interests and, depending on the source of their capital, have supported different positions on neoliberal policies. However, the core of this social class—that is, owners and managers of large corporations—seems to benefit from and to be supportive of neoliberal reforms. On the other hand, some pension fund managers are owned by unions or cooperatives—for example, AFAP Integración in Uruguay (121). However, these organizations are compelled to follow market rules and are very unlikely to affect the redistribution of wealth. Moreover, these arrangements promote the division of the labor movement because only some groups or unions control and manage their own companies and agreement among different labor groups on a common proposal for social security reform becomes more difficult.
Bank projects: (a) the Health Sector Reform Project in Bolivia, which reached $25 million, included a service fee of 0.75 percent (124); (b) the Provincial Health Services Project for the Dominican Republic ($30 million) included a commitment fee of 0.75 percent (125); and (c) the Health Reform Program for Peru included a commitment fee (0.75 percent) and a front-end fee (1 percent) (126).

Regardless of its origin, the external debt burden constitutes major monetary resources that, rather than being invested in the welfare of the people, are transferred to the core countries (127, 128). Several countries allocated more resources to serve the external debt than to provide health services to their populations. During the past two decades, payment of the debt service (the interest that borrower countries must pay on external debts) by Latin American countries amounted to more than 20 percent of the total exports of goods and services, about 20 percent of central government revenues, and about 8 percent of gross national products (Table 7). Thus, the implementation of neoliberal reforms has contributed to maintaining the external debt owed by Latin American countries to the industrialized countries, a sign of the international power inequalities that reinforce the leverage of IFIs over the Latin American countries and reduce the internal political maneuverability of the indebted countries.

A fourth dimension of these transfers from labor to capital, particularly in the case of pension reform, is the power of the AFPs over capital markets. The AFPs are in charge of investing large amounts of money contributed by workers; they choose where to invest that money and, as a consequence, have a lot of power. Regardless of government regulations on investments, the AFPs’ power over capital markets stands in stark contrast to workers’ powerlessness in making decisions about the investment of their own money. Furthermore, the AFPs gain a lot of leverage over several companies in which they easily become the biggest shareholders (86).

Finally, the impact of these reforms on reproducing or exacerbating health inequalities shows a different sphere of the transfer of resources from workers to capital. Although the effect of IFI-promoted social policies on the health of the people of Latin America is difficult to disentangle from the effects of other neoliberal measures—as well as other historical, social, economic, and political processes—on the huge social and health disparities among and within Latin American countries, different mechanisms have been suggested to explain the impact of neoliberal policies on health. They include transfer of resources among different groups in the population, a widening of the income gap between the capitalist and working classes, a weakening of the welfare state, and deterioration of labor conditions (11, 129–136). Regardless of optimistic claims that reforms have improved the quality of life of Latin Americans (137), several analyses of the impact of neoliberal reforms suggest that neoliberal policies reinforce or maintain health inequalities. For instance, Fernández (138) has argued that the impact of neoliberalism in Nicaragua was particularly adverse among poor women, because
(a) they were more likely to fill the gaps created by the reduction or elimination of social services, both in the household and in the community; (b) domestic violence and maternal mortality increased; and (c) they were more likely to be the first to leave the formal sector for the informal sector of the economy or to become unpaid laborers. Others have also extensively documented the harmful effects of neoliberal policies on Latin American women (139). Moreover, studies have

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Regional averages include 22 Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
shown adverse effects of user fees in Bolivia (140) and of increasing administrative costs, including investment in advertising private health care providers in Chile (141), as well as a lack of success in increasing health care coverage (66). Other health disparities associated with the implementation of neoliberal policies and privatization of services include increased rates of malaria (142, 143) and violence (144) and a deterioration of maternal and child health (145).

ARE THERE ANY POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES?

Given the assumption of an unavoidable globalized society, there are calls for further neoliberal reforms of welfare states and strengthening of those changes already implemented in the third and first worlds. Several institutions present the Latin American reforms, particularly the Chilean pension reform, as an example for the rest of the world. In fact, the privatization of social security has often been suggested for the United States and Europe (146, 147). The Cato Institute, for example, has lobbied for privatization of the U.S. Social Security system; it even hired Jose Piñeira, designer of Chile’s pension system, as co-chair for this project (148). Several programs along this line have also been carried out or suggested in former socialist countries; for example, a Chilean AFP has already opened a private pension fund manager in Poland (149). These calls underline the idea that no other choices are possible for the world’s welfare states and that national politics matter little given this global trend.

Apart from these international influences, however, implementation of IFI-sponsored reforms in Latin America has been closely related to national politics (e.g., 150, 151). The deepest privatization of social security was carried out in Chile under a repressive military regime that did not allow any political opposition (152). Likewise, privatization in Peru was decreed under a regime that severely restricted political participation (153, 154). On the other hand, the mixed public and private models that were developed in Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico resulted from active opposition to privatization by political parties and organized labor (122). Costa Rican opposition to the privatization of public enterprises (155) is another example of the effectiveness of both a political party and a labor movement that support a strong welfare state. And despite all the economic sanctions faced by Cuba, that country has succeeded in developing a welfare state that has produced some of the best health indicators in the region and lower health inequalities within the country (156). This concurs with the evidence that countries where social democratic or socialist policies prevail are likely to be more successful in strengthening their welfare states, reducing inequalities, and improving health status (157–161). Huber (75) and Mesa-Lago and colleagues (162) have shown that the development of social security in Latin America was strongly influenced by the strength of the labor movement, and this also determines the extent to which neoliberal reforms are implemented. On the other hand,
the implementation of neoliberal measures has also created barriers to labor organization (163), and social security reforms have contributed to the weakening of labor, particularly by excluding solidarity as a fundamental principle of social security, as we have shown. Union within labor and alliances with other classes are discouraged.

Neoliberal reforms of welfare states are not inevitable (164). There is room for national governments in Latin America to define and carry out redistributive, non-neoliberal policies and to strengthen their welfare states, as several international experiences confirm. From different political perspectives, Cuba and Costa Rica have maintained public universal coverage for health care under strong welfare states. In Venezuela, a 1998 law that decreed the privatization of social security, including health, pensions, and workers’ compensation, following the Chilean and Colombian model has been overruled by a new political constitution, which establishes health and social security as universal rights to be guaranteed by the state. It also sets up guidelines for creating a public and not-for-profit social security system, including a national health service that is based on public financing and provision of services and strengthens the principle of solidarity (165). Electoral and non-electoral popular movements, such as those of Chiapas (166) in Mexico and the Landless Workers in Brazil (167), and coalitions between Northern and Southern organizations in opposing IFI policies (e.g., World Social Forum, Porto Alegre; see 168) provide room for the construction of alternatives to neoliberal views.

Note — This article is an expanded version of a paper presented at the Latin American Association of Social Medicine (ALAMES) meeting in Havana, Cuba, July 3–7, 2000.

APPENDIX

All Web site addresses begin http://www, unless otherwise noted.


**Brazil:** AMICO Asistencia Medica (amico.com.br/), Cigna previdencia (cigna.com.br/previdencia/2.htm), AETNA Sul America (sulamerica.com.br/), SULAPREVI (sulaprevi.com.br/ingles/produtos.htm#1).
Chile: Aetna (aetna.cl/salud/), Provida (afpprovida.cl), Banmedica (banmedica.cl/), CIGNA Salud Isapre (cigna.cl/), Habitat (habitat.cl/), Superintendence of Isapres Chile (sisp.cl/), Vida Tres (vidatres.cl/), Cuprum (cuprum.cl), Magister (magister.cl), Santa Maria (stamaria.cl), Summa Santander (summabansander.cl).


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